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 PENSIONS AND QUITTING: A TEST AMONG COMPETING EXPLANATIONS1 
 
 Multiple regression analysis of 402 unionized, public utility employees is used 
to examine the effects of a final-earnings pension plan and other human 
resource management programs on the willingness to engage in quit 
behaviours in response to problems as work.  Consistent with expectations, 
employees facing higher expected losses under the pension plan are found less 
likely to quit.  The willingness to quit is also found to be reduced by other 
factors that raise the cost of this action to the individual (e.g., compensation 
premia), where dispute resolution options are perceived to be more effective 
(e.g., voice) and where the current setting is viewed more favourably (e.g., 
under conditions of higher affective commitment and job satisfaction).  
Implications for pension theory and research are discussed. 
 
 Over the past several decades, there has been an abundant number of empirical 
studies on role of occupational pension incentives, particularly as they relate to employee 
turnover (for recent reviews see Ippolito 1994, Gustman, Mitchell and Steinmeier 1994; and 
Dorsey 1995).  Much of this research follows an implicit contracting model in which 
employees are viewed as providing a long-term commitment and performance guarantee in 
exchange for an implied right to employment security and a pension linked to salary just 
prior to retirement.  The pension plan plays an important enforcement role in this model by 
imposing a loss in the form of reduced benefits for employees who quit prior to the 
completion of their long-term contract. 
 
 Despite all the research conducted, however, important questions remain unanswered 
about pension contracts such as how much employees know about them and how important a 
role they play in encouraging long-term employment relations.  In the pension-turnover 
research, for example, separation measures do not always closely distinguish the reasons for 
departure and so don't provide a strong test of how cognizant employees are of the pension 
incentive in choosing to remain or not in the long-term contract (Luchak 1997).  Isolating the 
effect of the pension on the voluntary quit decision would provide more direct evidence of 
employee responsiveness, and hence understanding, of their pension contracts.  Also, pension 
loss is often imputed based on average plan characteristics rather than actual plan features so 
that the actual amounts of pension loss that employees are presumed to respond to is not fully 
known.  Finally, little or no control is typically provided for alternative mechanisms for 
encouraging long tenure in the firm (e.g., other seniority based benefits, efficiency wages, an 
attractive work setting, due process mechanisms) so that the unique effects of pensions vis-a-
vis other HR practices are not fully known (Gustman, Mitchell and Steinmeier 1994). 
 
 Based on data gathered in 1997 from a group of full-time, unionized public utility 
workers covered by a defined-benefit pension plan in Ontario, this study addresses some of 
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these gaps in the literature.  Specifically, the effects of pension capital loss on employee 
quitting, after controlling for other potential explanations for exit under long-term 
employment contracts is examined.  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  In 
the next two sections, an elaboration of the theoretical framework and manner in which 
pensions and other workplace programs affect the incentive to quit under long-term 
employment contracts is provided.  Data and methodology are then discussed and findings 
are analyzed.  Lastly, a discussion and conclusion completes the paper. 
 
 
 Theoretical Model 
 
 The decision to quit is conceptualized as a form of withdrawal behaviour that employees 
may engage in in response to a workplace problem (Withey and Cooper, 1989).  Quitting is viewed 
as a product of three general factors: 
 
 QUIT = f (COST, INSTRUMENTALITY, ATTRACTIVENESS) 
 
where COST refers to the cost of venting one's frustrations through the quit decision, 
INSTRUMENTALITY refers to the effectiveness of alternative dispute resolution methods 
available to employees for addressing their problems, and ATTRACTIVENESS refers to the 
desirability of remaining in the current job and expending the necessary time and effort to reduce 
the sources of problems causing dissatisfaction at work.  The higher the costs of exit, more 
instrumental are dispute resolution procedures, and attractive is the current setting, the less 
employees are expected to withdraw through the quit behaviour. 
 
 
 Pensions and Alternative Influences on Quitting 
 
 There are a variety of mechanisms for encouraging long-term employment contracts, and 
hence, reducing the propensity to engage in quit behaviour.  Failure to control for these factors may 
lead to omitted variable problems and, hence, faulty conclusions about the incentive effects of 
pensions and other human resource management programs. 
 
Pension Capital Loss 
 
 The most common form of occupational pension plan bases benefits on a formula that 
multiplies final earnings by years of pensionable service and a constant.  Such final-earnings 
formulas penalize early leavers (e.g., quitters, those who are dismissed for just cause) in two main 
ways.  First, the early leaver's pension is fixed in nominal terms at the point of termination rather 
than their pre-retirement wage so their pension does not reflect any of the nominal wage growth that 
would normally occur during this period.  Second, early leavers forego entitlement to more 
generous early retirement subsidies which are generally allocated on the basis of higher years of 
continuous service or membership in the pension plan.  Assuming non-portability between plans, 
quitting creates discontinuities which prevent employees from taking advantage of the cumulative 
value of their pensionable service over their career.  Generally, the final-earnings pension is 
expected to increasingly reduce the propensity to quit by increasingly confronting the employee 
with a stronger economic loss for failing to remain with the firm.  Other things equal, if employees 
desire pension contracts and respond to their incentives they should be less willing to voluntarily 




 Investments in firm-specific training may discourage quitting because the returns to such 
training can only be realized through continued employment.  Thus, if employees share in the costs 
and benefits of specific training they may be less willing to quit as this would prevent them from 
amortizing the full costs and realizing the full benefits of their training investment.  Pension covered 
employees have been found more likely to receive training (Hutchens 1987) suggesting the 





 Rewarding longer service with increasingly better job rights such as increased wages and 
benefits, and greater promotion opportunities and protection from arbitrary treatment can encourage 
long-term employment contracts, particularly in unionized environments where seniority is more 
heavily relied upon as a decision making criterion.  The general non-portability of seniority based 
benefits between jobs raises the cost of quitting so that higher seniority may be associated with less 




 Tilted wage profiles that pay employees below-market wages early in their career and 
above-market wages later in their career can encourage long-term employment contracts, and hence, 
discourage quit behaviour.  Employees will be less likely to quit early under these circumstances for 
fear of losing the higher wage later in their career.  Empirical evidence showing a positive 
correlation between pension coverage and higher wages provides some support for this proposition 
(Lazear 1979).  As a determinant of job changing, more recent evidence suggests that wage tilt may 




 Compensation premia, or the payment of rents to employees, may encourage long-term 
contracts (Allen, Clark and McDermed 1993; Gustman and Steinmeier 1993).  Compensation 
premia may be especially important during the early stages of a career when employees are 
generally more mobile and pension capital loss is small.  Alternatively, it may be paid as a 
compensating wage for the risk of layoff, especially where reputation costs to the firm for reneging 
on pension commitments are low (Gustman, Mitchell and Steinmeier 1994).  Evidence of pension-
covered employees receiving premia is contained in empirical research showing that there is not a 
dollar-for-dollar tradeoff between pensions and wages and that pension covered job changers 
receive low wages.  There is disagreement in the literature as to whether pension capital losses 
(Allen, Clark and McDermed 1993) or compensation premia (Gustman and Steinmeier, 1993) are 
the primary determinants of the lower mobility observed among pension-covered workers. 
 
Labour Market Sorting 
 
 Labour market sorting argues that employees with greater productive characteristics sort 
themselves into long-term employment contracts (Allen, Clark and McDermed, 1993).  According 
to this view, pensions and other human resource management programs don't reduce quitting, but 
rather, attract workers with characteristics of value to the firm and discourage those with unwanted 
characteristics (Gustman, Mitchell and Steinmeier 1994).  Thus, the pension or other human 
resource management programs are an efficient means by which firms are able to deal with 
asymmetric information about unobservable worker characteristics.  In pension research, the sorting 
hypothesis is typically tested by looking for a residual effect of pension coverage on employee 
behaviour, after controlling for pension capital loss.  Pension research shows the sorting hypothesis 
to play an important, but secondary role to pension capital loss as a determinant of job changing 
(Allen, Clark and McDermed 1993). 
 
Instrumental Dispute Resolution 
 
 Providing instrumental forms of dispute resolution can be expected to encourage long-term 
employment relations, particularly in the case of human resource management programs that 
require employees to relinquish the exit option as a dispute resolution tactic.  Where "safety-valves" 
for the expression of conflict are provided (e.g., voice), employees should feel less compelled to 
rely on other responses such as quitting to settle their differences (Hebdon and Stern 1998).  
Alternatively, however, by making supervisors look bad, voicers may be more subject to retributive 
behaviours (Lewin 1987; Lewin and Peterson 1988; Klaas and De Nisi 1989) increasing the 
probability of responses other than voice as a dispute resolution tactic. 
 
Attractiveness of the Work Setting 
 
 Employees are more likely to agree to long-term employment relations and to expend the 
necessary time and effort to manage employment disputes in ways other than through quitting 
where they find the work setting to be more attractive (Withey and Cooper 1989).  Not using the 
exit option in these cases is likely for various reasons.  For example, employees attracted to the 
work setting likely view their interests as more closely aligned to those of the firm, and as a result, 
may be expected to stay, recognizing that this decision will not only benefit the organization but 
also themselves.  Attraction to the work setting may also be a result of greater satisfaction with 




 Research Methodology 
 
 The data for this study was gathered through a survey administered in the late spring/early 
summer 1997 to a random sample of approximately 1250 regular full-time employees in a large, 
unionized, public utility company in the province of Ontario.  Surveys were distributed through the 
company's inter-office mail system to union members at their places of work.  Data collection 
continued throughout the summer with two follow-up letters reminding individuals to complete and 
return the survey.  In the end, 429 surveys were returned for a response rate of approximately 35%.  
This response rate is somewhat low and is most likely due to the long length of the questionnaire 
(12 pages), sensitive nature of some of the questions, and its distribution during summer months.  
Notwithstanding these concerns, however, characteristics of the achieved sample compared very 
favourably with actual characteristics of the bargaining unit suggesting that the 429 responses were 
fairly reflective of the union's membership as of the summer 1997.  For example, sample estimates 
showing approximately 18% of all employees to be female and, on average, to be 42 years of age 
with 15 years of service and earning $53,000 annually, compare favourably with descriptive 
statistics provided by the union showing 19% of all members to be female and, on average, to be 41 




 The dependent variable (QUIT) was measured by 3-items based on a question asking 
respondents how often they engaged in the following behaviours over the past year.  The items were 
"thought about quitting", "searched for another job" and "intended to quit the job."  Responses were 
measured on a 7-point scale ranging from 1=almost never to 7=almost always, with the mid-point 
4=sometimes.  Coefficient alpha reliability for this scale was .73.  The sum of the 3 response items 
was divided by 3 leading to an average QUIT score of 2.52 (S.D.=1.50).  This dependent variable 
offers the advantage of measuring employee initiated quit attitudes and behaviours and so provides 
a stronger test of employee responsiveness to pension incentives. 
 
Pension Capital Loss 
 
 Following the work of Lazear and Moore (1988) and Stock and Wise (1990), the reduced 
value of pension benefits from early departure is modelled as the loss of an option value 
(PENSION).  A worker who quits or is discharged loses the option of working and accruing 
additional pension benefits.  The option value in this study is defined as the present discounted 
value of the difference in maximum pension payments if one were to work until their pension 
wealth was maximized in the current job (the stay pension), and their wealth from two other jobs, 
identical in all respects to the present but for the fact that separation from the first job and the start 
of the second job occurs immediately (the quit pensions).  The difference in pension wealth 
between the two scenarios is not due to different years of service as retirement in the quitter's 
second job is constrained to occur at the same age that pension wealth is maximized for the job 
stayer.  Option values are expressed as a ratio of the employee's current annual salary and are 
calculated in the context of a plan that provides a lifetime pension payable as early as age 55 (for 
the vast majority of employees).  The benefit received is based on a varying percentage of 
employees' highest three consecutive years of salary multiplied by their year's of continuous service 
under the plan.  Annual benefits get a guaranteed annual increase equal to three-quarters of the 
previous year's increase in the consumer price index.  In constructing the option value measure, 
certain assumptions were made: inflation and nominal interest rates were assumed to grow at annual 
rates of 3% and 8%, respectively, and date of death varied by current age.   Higher option values to 
continued work are expected to reduce the propensity for quitting.  On average, not remaining in the 





 As mentioned, other factors are expected to influence the quit decision and need to be 
controlled to provide stronger tests of employees' responsiveness to their pension contracts.  In 
particular, controls are provided for firm-specific human capital, seniority, wage tilt, compensation 
premia, labour market sorting, instrumentality of dispute resolution mechanisms and the 
attractiveness of the work setting. 
 
 The extent of firm specific training (TRGSPEC) received by respondents is measured by a 
question asking them to indicate how much they agreed with the statement that the employer-
sponsored education, training and development they received over the past 3 years would not be 
very useful outside the organization.  Responses were measured on a 7-point scale ranging from 
1=strongly disagree to 7=strongly agree.  Because the returns to specific training can only be 
captured through continued employment, it should reduce the willingness to engage in quit 
behaviour (M=3.72, S.D.=1.93). 
 
 By rewarding longer-term employees with increased wages and greater promotion 
opportunities, and protection from arbitrary treatment, seniority is expected to be associated with 
lower quit behaviour.  Seniority is measured by years of credited service under the pension plan 
(SENIORITY).  On average, respondents had 14.5 years of service (M=14.49, S.D.=6.82).  
Seniority, as well as a measure of earnings (SALARY) may also provide a rough proxy for wage-tilt 
in that low levels of seniority or salary will likely reflect below-average wages early in one's career 
and higher levels of seniority or salary will likely reflect above-average wages later in one's career.  
On average, respondents earned $53,400 annually (M=53.43, S.D.=7.92). 
 
 Compensation premia (PREMIA) was measured by a question asking respondents to 
indicate how much better they believed comparable other employee's terms and conditions of 
employment were relative to their own (the 7-items measured were: wages; pension benefits; other 
benefits; employment security; opportunities for advancement; rights to due process; and working 
conditions).  Measurement was on a 7-point scale ranging from 1=much worse to 7=much better.  
Scores were reverse coded so that higher PREMIA values represent the extent that employees 
believe their own terms and conditions of employment are better than those received by comparable 
other employees working in different organizations (alpha=.84, M=4.33, S.D.=.96).  The higher the 
compensation premia employees risk forfeiting, the lower the likelihood they will engage in quit. 
 
 Labour market sorting (SORT) is measured directly by a 3-item scale that asked respondent 
to think back when they were first hired and indicate the extent that they "were attracted to the 
organization in hopes of a stable, long-term job", "accepted the job knowing that a long-term 
relationship was expected and would be rewarded" and "had a good understanding of terms and 
conditions of employment, including the pension plan."  Measurement was on a 7-point scale 
ranging from 1=strongly disagree to 7=strongly agree (alpha=.72, M=5.90, S.D.=1.15).  If human 
resource management program impacts operate through labour market sorting then this variable 
should be negatively associated with quit behaviour. 
 
 Instrumentality perceptions of two voice mechanisms are measured by two questions 
asking respondents to indicate how effective a means directly voicing your concerns "to a person in 
authority" (INDVOICE) and "through the union" (UNIVOICE) were in responding to an important 
problem in their workplace.  Both items were measured on a 7-point scale ranging from 1=highly 
ineffective to 7=highly effective.  Means and standard deviations for the instrumentality of 
individual and union voice items were: INDVOICE (M=5.04, S.D.=1.88) and UNIVOICE 
(M=4.52, S.D.=1.86).  Employees using voice may be more (the "supervisor retribution" effect) or 
less (the "safety valve" effect) likely to quit. 
 
 Feelings of belonging, identification and involvement with the organization (ACS) and 
higher levels of general job satisfaction (SATIS) likely reduce the tendency to engage in quit 
behaviour as such employees view the organization as a more attractive place to work.  More 
satisfied employees may also have less sense of grievance because existing dispute resolution 
mechanisms in the organization are considered sufficiently effective.  ACS is measured by an 8-
item affective commitment scale (see Allen and Meyer, 1990; Meyer and Allen, 1984; 1991).  A 7-
point scale was used with higher scores reflecting higher levels of affective commitment to the 
organization (M=3.84, S.D.=1.24).  Coefficient alpha reliability for this scale was .82.  General job 
satisfaction (SATIS) is measured by a 5-item scale of its major facets: pay, promotions, co-workers, 
supervision and the work itself.  Items were measured on a 7-point scale ranging from 1=very 
dissatisfied to 7=very satisfied (M=4.58, S.D.=1.10).  Coefficient alpha reliability for this scale was 
.64. 
 
 Other control variables included in the model are age (AGE) gender (FEMALE), marital 
status (MARRIED) and five occupational (OTHTRADE, CIVTRADE, OPERATOR, CLERICAL, 
TECHNICA) and two geographic work location (REGION, NUCLEAR) dummy variables.  Older 
workers (AGE) are generally less mobile which both raises the cost of quitting and increases the 
attractiveness of working for change within the current organization.  Age was measured through a 
question asking respondents to indicate their year of birth.  The average respondent was 41.58 years 
of age (S.D.=7.21).  All things being equal, it is not clear whether males and females (FEMALE) 
should differ in their willingness to engage in quit behaviour.  Fewer job opportunities due to 
systemic labour market discrimination, delayed career entry due to child rearing and family 
responsibilities, and/or longer life expectancies may all combine to raise the costs of quitting from 
good paying, long-term jobs for females.  Gender is measured dichotomously (1=female; 0=male).  
Approximately 18% of the sample was female (M=.18, S.D.=.38).  Employees who are married 
(MARRIED) may be less likely to quit because it is costly to the effective functioning of the 
household.  Marital status is measured dichotomously (1=married; 0=otherwise).  Approximately 





 The final specification of a reduced form OLS equation in which QUIT is regressed on the 
various independent variables is found in Table 1.  Beta weights, which are the coefficients of the 
independent variables when all variables are expressed in standardized (z-score) form, are included 
in the table to make comparisons between independent variables somewhat more comparable 
(Norusis 1988).  Sample size dropped slightly to N=402 due to a small number of missing values 
spread across the variables under consideration.   
 
 The regression results are generally consistent with expectations.  In particular, the 
coefficient on PENSION is consistent with expectations that as the option value of continued work 
increases, employees are less likely to engage in quit related behaviours.  Moreover, this finding 
occurs after controlling for other important determinants of quitting. 
 
 Among variables reflecting plausible alternative mechanisms for encouraging long-term 
contracts, identification and satisfaction with the organization, voice mechanisms and compensation 
premia all played a role in influencing quit propensities.  The PREMIA effect is consistent with the 
work of Gustman and Steinmeier, 1993 however, how much of this effect represents an efficiency 
wage is not immediately obvious.  While the instrumentality of dispute resolution mechanisms 
available to respond to problems were found to be important, they worked in opposite directions.  
The negative coefficient on INDVOICE supports the safety valve hypothesis whereas the positive 
coefficient on UNIVOICE supports the supervisor retribution hypothesis.  Both ACS and SATIS 
results were very robust and quantitatively significant highlighting the importance of an attractive 
work setting in which to incur, among other things, the risk of pension loss. 
 
 Specific training (TRGSPEC), labour market sorting (SORT) and seniority (SENIORITY) 
effects were not significant for the population but the coefficients for these variables were in the 
anticipated direction.  Conversely, the salary (SALARY) coefficient was significant but in the 
wrong direction.  The first three effects may operate through other variables such as ACS or SATIS. 
 The poor showing of SENIORITY may also reflect countervailing influences in its impact on 
quitting.  For example, certain seniority benefits available to the employees in this sample are 
portable (e.g., health and dental coverage is provided after termination where employees have 25 or 
more years of service) so that once this seniority threshold has been met, the costs of quitting 
becomes lower.  The absence of a negative earnings effect may be due to the fact that higher earners 
have more marketable skills that reduce the costs of quitting.  It may also reflect the frustrations of 
higher income earners stuck at the tops of their salary scales.  The insignificance of the 
SENIORITY and SALARY variables may also reflect the limitations inherent in wage tilt programs 
for encouraging long-term employment relations.  For example, by redistributing income and tax 
liability to the later stages of employees' careers such programs may run contrary to their life cycle 
needs for disposable income and increase their overall exposure to tax liability.  Also, such 
programs would appear difficult to implement given the need to alter wage levels depending on age 
of entry into the job, a practice that would appear inconsistent with age discrimination laws 
(Gustman, Mitchell and Steinmeier 1994). 
 
 Table 1. OLS Regression Analysis of QUIT (N=402) 
 
                                                                   
Variable              B        SE B       Beta         T  Sig T 
                                                                   
 
AGE               -.003        .011      -.018     -.342   .732 
FEMALE             .594**      .249       .150     2.383   .017 
MARRIED            .096        .183       .022      .527   .598 
ACS               -.375***     .060      -.311    -6.256   .000 
SATIS             -.353***     .066      -.257    -5.346   .000 
PREMIA            -.131*       .072      -.084    -1.824   .069 
INDVOICE          -.082**      .038      -.103    -2.161   .031 
UNIVOICE           .076**      .036       .094     2.092   .037 
TRGSPEC           -.021        .032      -.027     -.638   .523 
SORT              -.029        .056      -.022     -.524   .600 
SENIORITY         -.019        .014      -.087    -1.329   .184 
SALARY             .027**      .013       .145     2.064   .039 
OTHTRADE          -.029        .269      -.005     -.109   .913 
CIVTRADE          -.141        .254      -.026     -.556   .578 
OPERATOR          -.716***     .209      -.174    -3.425   .000 
CLERICAL          -.376        .328      -.088    -1.147   .252 
TECHNICAL         -.444**      .187      -.129    -2.365   .018 
REGION            -.464**      .216      -.150    -2.144   .032 
NUCLEAR           -.559***     .210      -.186    -2.656   .008 
PENSION           -.216**      .101      -.114    -2.135   .033 
CONSTANT          6.248***     .979                6.379   .000 
 
R²                 .358 
Adj-R²             .325 
F                10.633*** 
                                                                   
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
 
 Finally, among control variables, females (FEMALE) were significantly more likely to 
want to quit, as well as employees in certain occupations and work locations.  The FEMALE effect 
may reflect their somewhat better retirement options under this particular plan (some female 
employees can retire as early as age 50) which raises the relative costs of responding to workplace 
problems through the quit option. 
 
 
 Discussion and Conclusions 
 
 Using data from a 1997 survey of unionized, public utility employees, this study finds that 
expected pension capital losses reduce the willingness of employees to utilize the quit option as a 
way to respond to workplace problems.  This willingness is also found to be reduced by other 
factors that raise the cost of this action to the individual (e.g., compensation premia, gender), where 
dispute resolution options are perceived to be more effective (e.g., voice) and where the current 
setting is viewed more favourably (e.g., under conditions of higher affective commitment and job 
satisfaction). 
 
 The finding that expected pension losses reduce the use or perceived need for quitting is 
consistent with implicit contracting arguments that pensions help maintain long-term employment 
contracts.  The results of this study also suggest the importance of other human resource 
management practices working in complement with pensions in promoting long-term employment 
contracts.  For example, efficiency wages and pension capital losses may work in concert, with the 
former creating an incentive for younger workers to stay at a time when pension capital loss is low, 
and the latter playing more of a role in penalizing quit behaviour among middle aged workers.  Also 
of importance will be human resource management programs that provide some sense of 
identification with and reason to want to belong to the organization, as well as for fair and effective 
procedures for the resolution of interest and other disputes at work.  Absent these conditions, 
employees may not be willing to accept the risk of capital losses under a final-average-earnings 
pension plan.  Pension research needs to more fully account for these factors when examining the 
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